Noam
Chomsky
Tomdispatch.com,
February 14, 2012
Significant
anniversaries are solemnly commemorated -- Japan's attack on the U.S. naval
base at Pearl Harbor, for example. Others are ignored, and we can often learn
valuable lessons from them about what is likely to lie ahead. Right now, in
fact.
At the
moment, we are failing to commemorate the 50th anniversary of President John F.
Kennedy's decision to launch the most destructive and murderous act of
aggression of the post-World War II period: the invasion of South Vietnam,
later all of Indochina, leaving millions dead and four countries devastated,
with casualties still mounting from the long-term effects of drenching South
Vietnam with some of the most lethal carcinogens known, undertaken to destroy
ground cover and food crops.
The prime
target was South Vietnam. The aggression later spread to the North, then to the
remote peasant society of northern Laos, and finally to rural Cambodia, which was
bombed at the stunning level of all allied air operations in the Pacific region
during World War II, including the two atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. In this, Henry Kissinger's orders were being carried out --
"anything that flies on anything that moves" -- a call for genocide
that is rare in the historical record. Little of this is remembered. Most was
scarcely known beyond narrow circles of activists.
When the
invasion was launched 50 years ago, concern was so slight that there were few
efforts at justification, hardly more than the president's impassioned plea
that "we are opposed around the world by a monolithic and ruthless
conspiracy that relies primarily on covert means for expanding its sphere of
influence" and if the conspiracy achieves its ends in Laos and Vietnam,
"the gates will be opened wide."
Elsewhere,
he warned further that "the complacent, the self-indulgent, the soft
societies are about to be swept away with the debris of history [and] only the
strong... can possibly survive," in this case reflecting on the failure of
U.S. aggression and terror to crush Cuban independence.
By the time
protest began to mount half a dozen years later, the respected Vietnam
specialist and military historian Bernard Fall, no dove, forecast that
"Vietnam as a cultural and historic entity… is threatened with
extinction...[as]...the countryside literally dies under the blows of the
largest military machine ever unleashed on an area of this size." He was
again referring to South Vietnam.
When the
war ended eight horrendous years later, mainstream opinion was divided between
those who described the war as a "noble cause" that could have been
won with more dedication, and at the opposite extreme, the critics, to whom it
was "a mistake" that proved too costly. By 1977, President Carter
aroused little notice when he explained that we owe Vietnam "no debt"
because "the destruction was mutual."
There are
important lessons in all this for today, even apart from another reminder that
only the weak and defeated are called to account for their crimes. One lesson
is that to understand what is happening we should attend not only to critical
events of the real world, often dismissed from history, but also to what
leaders and elite opinion believe, however tinged with fantasy. Another lesson
is that alongside the flights of fancy concocted to terrify and mobilize the
public (and perhaps believed by some who are trapped in their own rhetoric),
there is also geostrategic planning based on principles that are rational and
stable over long periods because they are rooted in stable institutions and
their concerns. That is true in the case of Vietnam as well. I will return to
that, only stressing here that the persistent factors in state action are
generally well concealed.
The Iraq
war is an instructive case. It was marketed to a terrified public on the usual
grounds of self-defense against an awesome threat to survival: the "single
question," George W. Bush and Tony Blair declared, was whether Saddam
Hussein would end his programs of developing weapons of mass destruction. When
the single question received the wrong answer, government rhetoric shifted
effortlessly to our "yearning for democracy," and educated opinion
duly followed course; all routine.
Later, as
the scale of the U.S. defeat in Iraq was becoming difficult to suppress, the
government quietly conceded what had been clear all along. In 2007-2008, the
administration officially announced that a final settlement must grant the U.S.
military bases and the right of combat operations, and must privilege U.S.
investors in the rich energy system -- demands later reluctantly abandoned in
the face of Iraqi resistance. And all well kept from the general population.
Gauging
American Decline
With such
lessons in mind, it is useful to look at what is highlighted in the major
journals of policy and opinion today. Let us keep to the most prestigious of
the establishment journals, Foreign Affairs. The headline blaring on the cover
of the December 2011 issue reads in bold face: "Is America Over?"
The title
article calls for "retrenchment" in the "humanitarian
missions" abroad that are consuming the country's wealth, so as to arrest
the American decline that is a major theme of international affairs discourse,
usually accompanied by the corollary that power is shifting to the East, to
China and (maybe) India.
The lead
articles are on Israel-Palestine. The first, by two high Israeli officials, is
entitled "The Problem is Palestinian Rejection": the conflict cannot
be resolved because Palestinians refuse to recognize Israel as a Jewish state
-- thereby conforming to standard diplomatic practice: states are recognized,
but not privileged sectors within them. The demand is hardly more than a new
device to deter the threat of political settlement that would undermine
Israel's expansionist goals.
The
opposing position, defended by an American professor, is entitled "The
Problem Is the Occupation." The subtitle reads "How the Occupation is
Destroying the Nation." Which nation? Israel, of course. The paired
articles appear under the heading "Israel under Siege."
The January
2012 issue features yet another call to bomb Iran now, before it is too late.
Warning of "the dangers of deterrence," the author suggests that
"skeptics of military action fail to appreciate the true danger that a
nuclear-armed Iran would pose to U.S. interests in the Middle East and beyond.
And their grim forecasts assume that the cure would be worse than the disease
-- that is, that the consequences of a U.S. assault on Iran would be as bad as
or worse than those of Iran achieving its nuclear ambitions. But that is a
faulty assumption. The truth is that a military strike intended to destroy
Iran's nuclear program, if managed carefully, could spare the region and the
world a very real threat and dramatically improve the long-term national
security of the United States."
Others
argue that the costs would be too high, and at the extremes some even point out
that an attack would violate international law -- as does the stand of the
moderates, who regularly deliver threats of violence, in violation of the U.N.
Charter.
Let us
review these dominant concerns in turn.
American
decline is real, though the apocalyptic vision reflects the familiar ruling
class perception that anything short of total control amounts to total
disaster. Despite the piteous laments, the U.S. remains the world dominant
power by a large margin, and no competitor is in sight, not only in the
military dimension, in which of course the U.S. reigns supreme.
China and
India have recorded rapid (though highly inegalitarian) growth, but remain very
poor countries, with enormous internal problems not faced by the West. China is
the world's major manufacturing center, but largely as an assembly plant for
the advanced industrial powers on its periphery and for western multinationals.
That is likely to change over time. Manufacturing regularly provides the basis
for innovation, often breakthroughs, as is now sometimes happening in China.
One example that has impressed western specialists is China's takeover of the
growing global solar panel market, not on the basis of cheap labor but by
coordinated planning and, increasingly, innovation.
But the
problems China faces are serious. Some are demographic, reviewed in Science,
the leading U.S. science weekly. The study shows that mortality sharply
decreased in China during the Maoist years, "mainly a result of economic
development and improvements in education and health services, especially the
public hygiene movement that resulted in a sharp drop in mortality from
infectious diseases." This progress ended with the initiation of the
capitalist reforms 30 years ago, and the death rate has since increased.
Furthermore,
China's recent economic growth has relied substantially on a "demographic
bonus," a very large working-age population. "But the window for
harvesting this bonus may close soon," with a "profound impact on
development": "Excess cheap labor supply, which is one of the major
factors driving China's economic miracle, will no longer be available."
Demography
is only one of many serious problems ahead. For India, the problems are far
more severe.
Not all
prominent voices foresee American decline. Among international media, there is
none more serious and responsible than the London Financial Times. It recently
devoted a full page to the optimistic expectation that new technology for
extracting North American fossil fuels might allow the U.S. to become energy
independent, hence to retain its global hegemony for a century. There is no
mention of the kind of world the U.S. would rule in this happy event, but not
for lack of evidence.
At about
the same time, the International Energy Agency reported that, with rapidly
increasing carbon emissions from fossil fuel use, the limit of safety will be
reached by 2017 if the world continues on its present course. "The door is
closing," the IEA chief economist said, and very soon it "will be
closed forever."
Shortly
before the U.S. Department of Energy reported the most recent carbon dioxide
emissions figures, which "jumped by the biggest amount on record" to
a level higher than the worst-case scenario anticipated by the International
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). That came as no surprise to many scientists,
including the MIT program on climate change, which for years has warned that
the IPCC predictions are too conservative.
Such
critics of the IPCC predictions receive virtually no public attention, unlike
the fringe of denialists who are supported by the corporate sector, along with
huge propaganda campaigns that have driven Americans off the international
spectrum in dismissal of the threats. Business support also translates directly
to political power. Denialism is part of the catechism that must be intoned by
Republican candidates in the farcical election campaign now in progress, and in
Congress they are powerful enough to abort even efforts to inquire into the
effects of global warming, let alone do anything serious about it.
In brief,
American decline can perhaps be stemmed if we abandon hope for decent survival,
prospects that are all too real given the balance of forces in the world.
"Losing"
China and Vietnam
Putting
such unpleasant thoughts aside, a close look at American decline shows that
China indeed plays a large role, as it has for 60 years. The decline that now
elicits such concern is not a recent phenomenon. It traces back to the end of
World War II, when the U.S. had half the world's wealth and incomparable
security and global reach. Planners were naturally well aware of the enormous
disparity of power, and intended to keep it that way.
The basic
viewpoint was outlined with admirable frankness in a major state paper of 1948
(PPS 23). The author was one of the architects of the New World Order of the
day, the chair of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, the respected
statesman and scholar George Kennan, a moderate dove within the planning
spectrum. He observed that the central policy goal was to maintain the
"position of disparity" that separated our enormous wealth from the
poverty of others. To achieve that goal, he advised, "We should cease to
talk about vague and... unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of
the living standards, and democratization," and must "deal in straight
power concepts," not "hampered by idealistic slogans" about
"altruism and world-benefaction."
Kennan was
referring specifically to Asia, but the observations generalize, with
exceptions, for participants in the U.S.-run global system. It was well understood
that the "idealistic slogans" were to be displayed prominently when
addressing others, including the intellectual classes, who were expected to
promulgate them.
The plans
that Kennan helped formulate and implement took for granted that the U.S. would
control the Western Hemisphere, the Far East, the former British empire
(including the incomparable energy resources of the Middle East), and as much
of Eurasia as possible, crucially its commercial and industrial centers. These
were not unrealistic objectives, given the distribution of power. But decline
set in at once.
In 1949,
China declared independence, an event known in Western discourse as "the
loss of China" -- in the U.S., with bitter recriminations and conflict
over who was responsible for that loss. The terminology is revealing. It is
only possible to lose something that one owns. The tacit assumption was that
the U.S. owned China, by right, along with most of the rest of the world, much
as postwar planners assumed.
The
"loss of China" was the first major step in "America's
decline." It had major policy consequences. One was the immediate decision
to support France's effort to reconquer its former colony of Indochina, so that
it, too, would not be "lost."
Indochina
itself was not a major concern, despite claims about its rich resources by
President Eisenhower and others. Rather, the concern was the "domino
theory," which is often ridiculed when dominoes don't fall, but remains a
leading principle of policy because it is quite rational. To adopt Henry
Kissinger's version, a region that falls out of control can become a
"virus" that will "spread contagion," inducing others to
follow the same path.
In the case
of Vietnam, the concern was that the virus of independent development might
infect Indonesia, which really does have rich resources. And that might lead
Japan -- the "superdomino" as it was called by the prominent Asia
historian John Dower -- to "accommodate" to an independent Asia as
its technological and industrial center in a system that would escape the reach
of U.S. power. That would mean, in effect, that the U.S. had lost the Pacific
phase of World War II, fought to prevent Japan's attempt to establish such a
New Order in Asia.
The way to
deal with such a problem is clear: destroy the virus and "inoculate"
those who might be infected. In the Vietnam case, the rational choice was to
destroy any hope of successful independent development and to impose brutal
dictatorships in the surrounding regions. Those tasks were successfully carried
out -- though history has its own cunning, and something similar to what was
feared has since been developing in East Asia, much to Washington's dismay.
The most
important victory of the Indochina wars was in 1965, when a U.S.-backed
military coup in Indonesia led by General Suharto carried out massive crimes
that were compared by the CIA to those of Hitler, Stalin, and Mao. The
"staggering mass slaughter," as the New York Times described it, was
reported accurately across the mainstream, and with unrestrained euphoria.
It was
"a gleam of light in Asia," as the noted liberal commentator James
Reston wrote in the Times. The coup ended the threat of democracy by
demolishing the mass-based political party of the poor, established a
dictatorship that went on to compile one of the worst human rights records in
the world, and threw the riches of the country open to western investors. Small
wonder that, after many other horrors, including the near-genocidal invasion of
East Timor, Suharto was welcomed by the Clinton administration in 1995 as
"our kind of guy."
Years after
the great events of 1965, Kennedy-Johnson National Security Adviser McGeorge
Bundy reflected that it would have been wise to end the Vietnam war at that
time, with the "virus" virtually destroyed and the primary domino
solidly in place, buttressed by other U.S.-backed dictatorships throughout the
region.
Similar
procedures have been routinely followed elsewhere. Kissinger was referring
specifically to the threat of socialist democracy in Chile. That threat was
ended on another forgotten date, what Latin Americans call "the first
9/11," which in violence and bitter effects far exceeded the 9/11
commemorated in the West. A vicious dictatorship was imposed in Chile, one part
of a plague of brutal repression that spread through Latin America, reaching
Central America under Reagan. Viruses have aroused deep concern elsewhere as
well, including the Middle East, where the threat of secular nationalism has
often concerned British and U.S. planners, inducing them to support radical
Islamic fundamentalism to counter it.
The
Concentration of Wealth and American Decline
Despite
such victories, American decline continued. By 1970, U.S. share of world wealth
had dropped to about 25%, roughly where it remains, still colossal but far
below the end of World War II. By then, the industrial world was
"tripolar": US-based North America, German-based Europe, and East
Asia, already the most dynamic industrial region, at the time Japan-based, but
by now including the former Japanese colonies Taiwan and South Korea, and more
recently China.
At about
that time, American decline entered a new phase: conscious self-inflicted
decline. From the 1970s, there has been a significant change in the U.S.
economy, as planners, private and state, shifted it toward financialization and
the offshoring of production, driven in part by the declining rate of profit in
domestic manufacturing. These decisions initiated a vicious cycle in which
wealth became highly concentrated (dramatically so in the top 0.1% of the
population), yielding concentration of political power, hence legislation to
carry the cycle further: taxation and other fiscal policies, deregulation,
changes in the rules of corporate governance allowing huge gains for
executives, and so on.
Meanwhile,
for the majority, real wages largely stagnated, and people were able to get by
only by sharply increased workloads (far beyond Europe), unsustainable debt,
and repeated bubbles since the Reagan years, creating paper wealth that
inevitably disappeared when they burst (and the perpetrators were bailed out by
the taxpayer). In parallel, the political system has been increasingly shredded
as both parties are driven deeper into corporate pockets with the escalating
cost of elections, the Republicans to the level of farce, the Democrats (now
largely the former "moderate Republicans") not far behind.
A recent
study by the Economic Policy Institute, which has been the major source of
reputable data on these developments for years, is entitled Failure by Design.
The phrase "by design" is accurate. Other choices were certainly
possible. And as the study points out, the "failure" is class-based.
There is no failure for the designers. Far from it. Rather, the policies are a
failure for the large majority, the 99% in the imagery of the Occupy movements
-- and for the country, which has declined and will continue to do so under
these policies.
One factor
is the offshoring of manufacturing. As the solar panel example mentioned
earlier illustrates, manufacturing capacity provides the basis and stimulus for
innovation leading to higher stages of sophistication in production, design,
and invention. That, too, is being outsourced, not a problem for the
"money mandarins" who increasingly design policy, but a serious
problem for working people and the middle classes, and a real disaster for the
most oppressed, African Americans, who have never escaped the legacy of slavery
and its ugly aftermath, and whose meager wealth virtually disappeared after the
collapse of the housing bubble in 2008, setting off the most recent financial
crisis, the worst so far.
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